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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1954
applicable section of the General Code in full effect for such purposes, held
that it was the legislative purpose that the statutes involved should have
continuing force and effect. Thus, the rules and regulations of the Depart-
ment of Liquor Control, as promulgated under the General Code, did not
Japse or become void -by reason of the revision but continued in full force
and effect. The Revised Code is not considered as a new enactment but is
a substitution for the existing statutory provisions as indicated by the plain
language of Section 1.24.
MAURICE S. CULP
AGENCY
During the past year the courts have dealt with a wide variety of prob-
lems in the master-servant and principal-agent areas. Most numerous were
cases involving insurance and real estate agents.
Acts Within the Scope of Authority
In theory the normal rules of agency apply to the insurance agent. In
fact, insurance companies do most of their business through local inde-
pendent agents; the home office is usually at a distant place; and the local
agent'is treated by the public as if he had authority not possessed by agents
in other fields. Both the courts and -the legislatures recognize this and
recent decisions indicate that the courts may be developing a new area
of law applicable to insurance companies only. The most common prob-
lems relate to the authority of an agent or sub-agent to issue an initial oral
contract of insurance, 'binding until the written contract is issued, the so-
called binder contract, and the authority orally to waive or modify an exist-
ing contract.
In Nellas v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. the company was locally
represented by a corporate general agent with authority to write policies.
Hill was an independent insurance broker, or solicitor, who did not repre-
sent any specific company, but solicited business for a number of com-
panies. The plaintiff called Hill and told him he wanted public liability
'96 Ohio App. 196, 121 N.E.2d 651 (1953). A somewhat similar fact situation was
before the court in Patten v. Contimental Casualty Co., 162 Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E.2d
441 (1954). In this case the insured was told by the agent that he was covered for
polio insurance. He failed to recover from the company, primarily because he sued
for tort damages, alleging unreasonable delay in the company's acceptance of his ap-
plicaton. On the basis of the Nellas and Coletta cases above, and cases cited therein,
the plaintiff would have been more likely to recover if he had sued on 'the policy
alleging authority in the agent to make a binder contract. The Patten case is also
discussed in the INsuRANcE section fnfra.
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coverage on his tavern. Hill and the president of the general agency
visited the premises and fixed the premium rate. On leaving the tavern,
-the man from the general agency told the plaintiff, 'When you are ready, let
Hill know." The plaintiff later told Hill that he was ready, and Hill re-
plied that the policy was now in effect. The insurable loss occurred before
the written policy was issued and the company was held liable on the oral
contract. The report does not indicate what authority, if any, the general
agent had to make a binder contract, nor what authority he had to delegate
the authority to an independent solicitor.
In Coletta v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.2 .the insured was covered by a
burglary policy which required him to keep a burglar alarm system m opera-
tion and further provided that no modification of the policy contract could
be made except by a written -rider. Burglars broke in and destroyed the
alarm system. The next day the loss was adjusted by Slusser, the vice presi-
dent of the corporate local general agent. At that tune Slusser told the
insured that he would be covered until the alarm system was replaced. Ten
days later, and before the alarm was repaired, burglars struck again. The
court of appeals allowed the insured to recover on the policy for the second
burglary loss. Again, there was no specific evidence of authority to modify
the written policy. The court reasoned that the "no oral modification7'
!provision could not disable the insurance company from orally modifying
its contract, and since the general agent had broad powers, the agent was
also precluded from relying on the policy provision and could delegate
the right to modify to its sub-agent, Slusser.
The Ohio courts also passed on several other aspects of agency authority,
none of which are unusual enough to merit detailed discussion.'
Notice To the Agent
In Griffin v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Co.4 the insurer directed
its local agent to mail a cancellation notice to the insured. ThIs was done
and the letter was returned. The agent had knowledge of non-delivery and
also had knowledge of the insured's place of employment. The court held
that notice to the agent was notice to the principal and thus the attempted
cancellation was ineffective.
'96 Ohio App. 70, 121 N.E.2d 148 (1953)
'Brent v. Advance Scale Mfg. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 259 (Ohio App. 1952) 116
N.E.2d 761 (President and treasurer of corporation had no implied authority to
execute corporate chattel mortgage without directors' approval, where in previous
instances they had obtained advance approval for each mortgage); Gilbert v. Kemp,
66 Ohio L. Abs. 140, 116 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio App. 1952) (agent who managed
farm under power of attorney could bind principal to contract of employment);
Wolfson v. Horn, 94 Ohio L Abs. 530, 116 N.E.2d 751 (Ohio App. 1953) (hus-
band had implied authority to bind his wife to contract for sale of land)
'94 Ohio L Abs. 403, 116 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio App. 1953).
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Raible v. Raydel5 involved the order of a trial court to a litigant to ap-
pear at a hearing on penalty of having his pleadings dismissed. It was held
that nonce of the order given to the lingan's attorney was valid notice to
the litigant and his cause of action could be dismissed for disobedience of
the order.
Relations Between Principal and Agent
In Connlly v. Balkwill6 the principal alleged that his agent had made
a secret personal profit while engaged in the sale of the principal's property.
The relief requested was an accounting and judgment for .the amount of the
profit. The supreme court held that the relation here involved was a fi-
duciary relation subject to equity jurisdiction. For this reason, the appeal
from the court of common pleas to the court of appeals should be on ques-
tions of both law and fact.
Where a real estate agentes desire for a commision conflicts with his
duty of full disclosure to his client, the courts will prefer the latter. In
McGarry v. McCrone,7 a case of first impression in Ohio, it was held that
where the broker knew or suspected that the purchaser he produced was
financially unable to purchase the property, the broker could not recover
his commission, although a contract of sale was entered into between the
seller and the prospective purchaser.
Hubman Supply Co. v. Irvn concerned the continuing duty of loyalty
after termination of the agency relationship. A salesman agreed with his
employer not to work for a competitor for ten months after termination of
his employment. The court refused to enjoin violation of the agreement
on the ground that it was a restraint on trade and in violation of public
policy.g
Master and Servant
Schoenmeyer v. Zah -0 involved the question of whether or not the
draver of an automobile was, at the tame of the accident, the agent or em-
ployee of the owner so as to charge the owner with liability. The defendant
purchased an automobile for the use of her 18 year old son, but retained
tile in her own name. The son asked a friend to drop hm off at his job
' 162 Ohio St. 25, 120 NE.2d 425 (1954).
' 160 Ohio St. 430, 116 N.E.2d 701 (1954).
'118 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio App. 1954).
'67 Ohio L Abs. 119, 119 NE.2d 152 (Franklin Com. P1. 1953).
'For a recent interesting discussion of the issues raised in similar cases see Note
Equvtable Enforcement of Negative Covenants so Employment Contracts, 6 WMsT.
REs. L. R . 72 (1954).
" 120 NXE.2d 150 (Ohio App. 1954).
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